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I. PROBLEMS OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
PHILIPPINES: PERSPECTIVES AND APPROACHES 
 
 
 
 
A.  Problems in Perspective 
It would be audacious to deal with the process of social change in Philippine society 
in all its ethnocentric, religio-cultural complexity as combined with the dynamics of political 
motive forces and their legal instrumentalities.  To identify in particular the function of the 
legal system in this process necessary entails the hazard of theoritization and abstraction 
based on both historical data and assumptions.  This effort, it is realized, becomes all the 
more formidable in the difficulty of designing a paradigm by which such social reality is to 
be interpreted in the context of “law and development.”  At any rate a statement of 
perspectives may be attempted as a response to this challenge. 
There is hardly any significant connection between the cultural or ethnographic 
character of indigenous or traditional Philippine society and the making of what is now 
established national law.  The socio-ethnological premises in the origins of the country’s 
national law were not historically situated in the Philippines.  This phenomenon is traceable 
to the complete displacement of the customary or indigenous law and its ethnico-cultural 
values by the legal system of colonialist Spain and, later, by Anglo-American jurisprudence 
of imperialist United States.  This total displacement was accomplished by the establishment 
of a State system as the administering mechanism of Spanish colonial empire and its 
subsequent replacement by a neocolonial State as a framework of American legal culture.  
Basic native ideas  pertaining to rights, obligations, and modes of dispute settlement did not 
have the benefit of systematic consideration in the wholesale transfer of legal  culture 
through colonial annexation. 
The highly formalized process of law-creation engaged by the State system thus 
implanted became instrumental in expediently screening out customary law from effective 
operation and thereby excluded the entire social context integral to the development of law.   
What did not emanate as legal norms from the recognized organs of the Colonial State could 
not have the status of law.  At best, under the new Civil Code, what may have been observed 
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by the native population as customary law, are accorded the status of “custom” which is 
required to be proved “as a fact, according to the rules of evidence,” (Civil Code Article 12)  
and it will not be given effect if “contrary to law, public order or public policy”(Civil Code, 
Art.  11).   It was not until the 1970s that Muslim personal law came into formal recognition 
and became part of national law.  Not until the advent of the Organic Act of the Autonomous 
Region in Muslim Mindanao in 1989 that a token gesture was made through a formal 
requirement on the Regional Assembly to provide “for the codification of indigenous laws 
and compilation of customary laws” towards a Tribal Code — on which no significant work 
has been done to date. 
Despite the alienation of the national legal system from the cultural and social 
context, no work of any significance has surveyed the critical problem areas, such as in the 
administration of justice or in dispute settlement.  Almost nil is the investigation of the social 
and political impact of laws enacted, studied, interpreted, and applied in a foreign language, 
on the receptiveness of the people to law compliance and based on the social and cultural 
values it embodies.   But the problem is hardly defined only in terms of translation of the 
legal text into the native languages.  That the very concepts or categories of thought in the 
law are transported from a foreign legal culture and drawn from a different stage of social 
development, constitute the more fundamental level of dislocation.  It is on the vehicle of this 
language problem that the social alienation of the legal system is perpetuated.  In the first 
place, conceptualized and articulated in a foreign language, the law breaks down as a means 
of communication in governance between the state authorities and the broad masses of 
people.  Secondly, failing to reflect the distinctive traits and social values of the people, the 
law can hardly be the mobilizing force of their creative energies which the legal system must 
assimilate to fulfill its social function in development.  If the discordance of the legal system 
with society is on the axiological level, it stands the danger of operating as a centrifugal force, 
incapable of performing an organizing role in a purposeful  program of development.  Lastly, 
the legal system in such a social incongruity  becomes identified with the interests of the elite 
whose mental processes and style of life are sustained by Westernized world outlook from 
which the premises of the imported legal culture is historically and conceptually derived. 
But hardly is the law perceived as a phenomenon disjointed from the social and 
cultural character of the people.  What is propagated instead is  the idealization of the law as 
a realization of a  Judaeo-Christian conscience and as the embodiment of the Anglo-
American revolution for the rule of law.  The development of the Philippine legal system is 
largely a process of how the people have been made to grow into the  law as it has developed 
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in its varied ramifications from the colonial legal culture.  This continuity is indeed striking, 
but more so is the socio-cultural distance of the law from reality.  Legal education is thus 
heavily oriented toward the perpetuation of such ideals, which are transformed into mythic 
values without much socio-cultural substance the moment they acquire contact with reality in 
terms of the outlook of the broad ranks of people. 
Towards a definition of the problem, a program on law and development may start 
from a synthesis of the social structure and level of development of Philippine society at a 
relevant historical period.  Given the main modalities of colonialism through the legal system, 
its impact on Philippine society in terms of law-and-development problems may be assessed.  
The general directions of law reform may be drawn up in the light of the projected path to 
development as objectively required by the general nature of the problems in the legal system 
in relation to social objectives.   With these points as background and premise, the relation of 
law with development may be brought into significance in the light of globalization trends 
and the adjustments these would require on the Philippine legal system. 
B. The Function of Law in Development 
In Asia, Latin America, and Africa, law reform projects have been undertaken in 
which law assumed a distinct function as an instrument for achieving the desired economic 
and political developments  (See David M. Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An 
Essay over the Study of Law and Development, 82 Yale L.J. 1, 2-3, 9-11, 42-47 (1972).   In a 
larger frame, this legal instrumentalism has been interpreted as a mechanism in a political 
teleology of modernization along the Western model of development.  As synthesized by a 
leading intepreter, a core conception of law may “prescribe positive programs for the legal 
developments of the Third World” in which — 
 
… there is the implicit concept of development which equates it with 
gradual evolution in the direction of the advanced, industrial nations of the 
West ….[This conception] quite predictably equates modern law with the 
legal structures and cultures of the West.  The Third World is thus assumed 
to be doomed to underdevelopment until it adopts a modern Western legal 
system (Trubek, at 10-11). 
 
In the Cold War period, law-and-development projects assumed an ideological 
motive force on the part of the capital-exporting Western powers and as part of a broad 
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policy orientation to provide conditions of stability for market mechanism in the developing 
countries.  In the face of socialist-oriented influences, law reforms in Third World countries 
as sponsored by Western sources propagated “rule of law” institutions to provide  appropriate 
conditions for the promotion and protection of private foreign investments (See Merlin M. 
Magallona, “The Philippines-United States Tax Convention: Suggestions for a Perspective”, 
in Merlin M.  Magallona, International Law Issues in Perspective, pp. 274, 301-302, 315-329 
(1996). The process of decolonization that accelerated in the 1960s under the influence of the 
United Nation anti-colonial policy accentuated the drive of the Western powers in 
competition with the socialist bloc to influence Third World developments toward liberal 
democratic directions and free-enterprise capitalism.  In this light, law-and-development 
studies became intensely political not only in terms of sectoral or piecemeal changes but, 
more significantly, in the rational structuring and canalization of State power as well.  Legal 
developments in the wake of the independence struggle became an integral part of State 
construction in the post-colonial  regime, which both ideological camps took strategic stake 
in influencing.  Legal instrumentalism finds contemporary context in the transition of the 
socialist States in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe into liberal democratic market 
economies.  Even as constitutional framework undergoes adjustments, legal reforms involves 
the introduction of democratic regulatory measures in the shift of “command economies” into 
“market economic societies”, from etatist ownership system to privatization. 
Following the implosion of the Soviet Union, legal instrumentalism  acquired a 
formidable role as  a medium for developing market forces and the dissolution of etatist 
elements.  On a macro-level the function of law finds important place in the reconstruction of 
the structure of political power in the relations between  the government  and the individual 
citizens and in the relation of the political system with the economy (See Mihaly Simai, “The 
Democratic Process and the Market: Key Aspects of the Transition in Comparative 
Perspective”, in Mihaly Simai (ed.), The Democratic Process and  The Market:  Challenges 
of the Transition, pp. 37, 46-48 (1999)). On the micro-level  it involves the introduction of 
free-market categories in law such as in contracts and property.    Without the rule of law, it 
is feared that the process of marketization, side by side with the freedoms of liberal 
democracy, would result in “klepto-capitalism” or “gangster economics” as in Russia of the 
early 1990’s (Id., at 46.  See also Oleg  Bogomolov, “Interrelations Between Political and 
Economic Change in Russia and the CIS Countries: A Comparative Analysis”, in Mihaly 
Simai, op. cit.  supra, note 4 at 77, 88-89).   As noted by one commentator in this light, “the 
rule of law has been considered another fundamental postulate of the political transformation 
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in societies where the ruling party was “above the law” and arbitrary decisions and 
government decrees provided the bulk of the institutional framework” (Mihaly Simai, op.cit., 
supra  note 4 at 46).  
On the theoretical plane, these approaches find  affinity with the function of law in 
Weber’s paradigm in which  the legal system has its highest stage of development in the 
rationality of modern capitalism associated with the purposive choice of means to attain a 
clearly defined goal towards profit (See Max Rheinstein, “Introduction”, in Max Weber in 
Economy and Society, p. lviii (1954)). Weber connects the rationality of law with the 
development of capitalism, although he remains imprecise in defining to what extent 
economic influences affect legal development.  Even as he rejects economic determinism in 
shaping the rationality of law, he is of the view that “certain rationalizations of economic 
behavior, based upon such phenomena  as a market economy or freedom of contract, and the 
resulting awareness of underlying, and increasingly complex conflicts of interests to be 
resolved by legal machinery,  have influenced the systematization of the law” (Max Weber, 
Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Guenther Roth and Claus 
Wittich (eds.), p. 655 (1978)).  Weber’s rationality in law or legal system has been 
interpreted as refering to a system governed by rules, characterized by legal analysis, and the 
controlling place of the intellect in a systematized legal order (See Anthony T. Kronman, 
Max Weber, pp. 72-75 (1983)).  
From the historical experience of Western industrial countries, a course of legal 
evolution has been abstracted  into a concept of social development as intertwined with legal 
culture.   Law as a social  process entails the enforcement of a system of rules as immanent in 
modern society.  Social control goes into the essential function of law.  The 
institutionalization of social control in the development of law inevitably entails the 
transformation of tribal norms or traditional customs into universal or general rules as well as 
the formation of common social objectives which are subserved by law as a purposive system.  
Thus, the “core conception” of modern law in social development as contrasted by Trubek 
from the social ordering of traditional societies, may be  presented as a process of  
disintegration of indigenous or customary law.  This process is integral to the centralization 
of  political authority in the formation of a state.  In the “social ordering of traditional 
societies”, patterns of conduct are defined and maintained by primary social groups, such as 
the village, lineage, or tribe.  As a result, normative prescription varies with geographic place 
and social situation:  There is a separate “law” for each village or tribe, and the “law” that 
binds the lord is not the law that binds the serf or burgher.  Modern law, on the other hand, 
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consists of general rules applied by specialized agencies universally and uniformly through 
all regions and to all social strata.  Modern law is also relatively autonomous from other 
sources of normative order.  Thus, one unitary and superior social entity — the modern legal 
system  — replaces the village or tribe in social control (David M. Trubek, op. cit., supra 
note 1, at 5).  
Instead of a contrast as Trubek does, this phenomenon may be seen as a process of 
universalization of norms of social control, in which the installation of a state system 
assumed a central role.   Thus, “the rise of modern law supplants local, ‘paternalistic’, and 
traditional forces, and … [becomes] the vehicle through which the State replaces communal 
or traditional authority” (Ibid.). 
C. Law and Development in Historical Experience 
1. The scale of social and economic reality encompassed by Philippine encounter 
with European colonialism is certainly not comparable with the methods of law-and-
development projects in the contemporary context.  However, the introduction of a legal 
system, such as on registration or recording of land rights, by the colonial power as an 
integral part of colonization may serve to illustrate how legal instrumentalism could impact 
with such massive violence on the life of the indigenous population, with enduring imprint 
on the country’s social structure today.   The peculiarity in the function of law in question is 
that it came as a logical extension of the colonial power’s level of social development, in 
which land even at that time had already become private property and land rights had been 
commodified. 
On the other hand, among the indigenous population as well as among the migrants 
that settled in the Philippine Archipelago then, land was considered as communal.  The 
distribution of land parcels  by the chieftains or datus of the social units called barangays 
was on the concept of usufruct, not on fee simple (John Leddy  Phelan, The Hispanization of 
the Philippines, Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, p. 117 (1959); William Henry Scott, 
Barangay, Sixteenth Century Philippine Culture and Society, pp. 229-230 (1995)).  In the 
Cordilleras, the indigenous communities took  landholding as a shared resource of all the 
members together with ancestors, the gods, and future generations (Cordillera  Studies 
Program, “Land Use and  Ownership and Public Policy”, in Episcopal Commision  on Tribal 
Filipinos,  Indigenous People in Crisis, pp. 23, 25-26 (1983)).  
The wholesale deprivation and dispossession of lands on the part of the indigenous 
population came with the imposition of the regalian doctrine that unless private rights to 
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lands were proved, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown (See Owen Lynch, Jr., “Land 
Rights, Land Laws and Land Usurpation”  (1565-1898), 63 Phil. L.J. 82, 83-85);  this legal 
principle prevailed together with the European concept of private, individual ownership, 
(Ibid.) which was implemented by a documentation system.  The advent of a more elaborate 
land registration system all the more accelerated concentration of land ownership, side by 
side with the widespread loss of land rights on the part of the natives and indigenous 
communities that were unable to show documentary proof of ownership over communal 
lands and ancestral domains.  Land acquisition became a prerogative of the members of the 
native elite and those who had access to Spanish colonial authorities.  Thus, the colonial land 
law operated as a means of usurpation en masse that lead to a social organization consisting 
of broad dispossessed masses and led by a land-owning elite  that came to be the repository 
of political  power in the post-colonial era. 
The Spanish land registration law gave motivation for the datus who were the 
trustee of the communal lands of the barangays to have these lands registered in their name 
as individual owners.  In the 16th and 17th century  the native elite, led by the Filipino upper 
class (the principales) enlarged their registered landholdings by encroaching on barangay 
communal lands and crown lands, leading to the formation of vast tracts of lands for 
plantation purposes (haciendas) (See Owen  Lynch, Jr., op.cit., supra note 16, at 90).  The 
Spanish friars were not to be outdone.  “Ecclesiastical estates”, Phelan notes, “were the 
largest single item of Spanish-owned latifundia” (John Leddy Phelan, op.cit., supra, note  14, 
at 118). 
2. Among the economic factors that motivated the conquest of the Philippines by the 
United States in the Spanish-American War of 1898 was the prospect of exploitation of its 
mineral resources.  Immediately following the victory of American naval forces at Manila 
Bay on 1 May 1898, U.S. Secretary of the Interior C.N. Bliss arranged with the U.S. 
Secretary of War for a “geologist of the U.S. Geological Survey to accompany the U.S. 
Military Expedition to the Philippines for the purpose of procuring information touching the 
geological and mineral resources of said islands”  (Renato Constantino, “Origin of a Myth ”, 
in James H. Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912, p. 8 (1968), 
quoting James H. Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines, p. 48 (1912).  The 
report of  the geologist “read like a mining stock prospectus” (Ibid.). 
Following the military occupation of the Philippines, the U.S. Congress enacted 
“The Philippine Bill of 1902”, which provided for the administration of the country’s first 
civil government.  Well-known as the vehicle for the historic introduction of the bill of civil 
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and political rights into the Philippines, this law substantially was a mining code.  Of its 88 
articles, 43 came under the heading “Mineral Lands”, declaring “all valuable mineral 
deposits in public lands … to be free and open to exploration, occupation, and purchase” and 
providing  for a detailed procedure of mineral claims and patents.  The bill of rights appeared 
to be a sideshow of the mining law; it  became a medium of guarantee that US nationals 
would have the fullest freedom under a rule of law in the exercise of mining rights. 
3. Historical experience clearly demonstrates that the colonial powers did not have 
any interest in the development of law as an end, independent from the political and 
economic motives of colonialism.  Obviously, it was inevitable that law was employed as a 
means integral to that motivation.  However, although admittedly law was an instrument of 
colonial expansion and was applied as a means of social control on the native population,  
… on the other hand, it also set some limits to European intervention and 
manipulation.  Whether these limits were to the advantage  or to the 
disadvantage of the indigenous population is open to debate  —  but limits 
they were (Jorg Fish, “Law as a Means and as an End:  Some Remarks on 
the Function of European and non-European Law in the Process of 
European Expansion”, in N.J. Momonsen and J.A. De Moor (eds.), 
European Expansion and Law, pp. 15-16 (1992)). 
 
For example, while the bill of rights in the Philippine Bill of 1902 assured U.S. 
nationals the freedom to deal with mineral resources as part of the general condition to do 
business, the impact of the guarantees of due process, the rights of the accused person, the 
freedom of speech, speech, assembly, and of religion, and  the right against unreasonable 
searches went into the foundation of a limited government, which operated as a constraint on 
the modalities of State power installed by U.S. imperialism at the time. 
 
4. The complete displacement of indigenous or local law by Spanish colonial law 
may have been an inevitability springing from the nature of colonization that was at once a 
process of State construction out of relatively independent barangays in the sixteenth-century 
Philippines.   The formation of a centralized State was not merely a political process; the 
religious mission of civilizing the natives by converting them to Catholicism was also a 
campaign of moral cleansing, the elimination of what appeared to the Spanish priests as 
superstitions embodied in customary law or indigenous morés.   The strengthening  of 
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colonial rule had to overcome the archipelagic nature of the Philippines by a centralized state 
structure   as the basis of local governments. 
The advent of U.S. imperialism, this time with the objective  of exploitation of 
natural resources, the expansion of market for American  manufactures, and the beginning of 
direct investments entailed the penetration of Philippine culture and society with commercial 
and financial laws within the regime of liberal democratic state that provided the widest 
latitude for the freedom of markets and profits.  More than that, this required the 
development of a concomitant broad legal culture to be propagated and maintained  by a 
local intelligentsia.  The logic of that legal culture has gone to an absurd extreme in which 
the country’s fundamental law and legislative enactments are conceptualized, judicially 
interpreted, popularly disseminated, propagated in the law schools, and effectively applied, 
all in the English language, the language of the elite and the intellectual sectors that stand 
apart from the vast masses of people  on account of their Westernized educational and 
cultural values.  Hidden from view behind legal structures and democratic forms, is this 
social predicament that obstructs the mobilization of the people for meaningful changes 
through law. 
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